In re M (Minors) (Child abduction: Undertakings) Court of Appeal [The London Times - Law Report - 15 Aug 1994] Before Lord Justice Butler-Sloss, Lord Justice McCowan and Sir Tasker Watkins Judgment 15 Jul 1994 A Hague Convention order for the return of a child to the country of his habitual residence was a final order and any application to set it aside had to be made by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal. Undertakings attached to an order for the return of a child under the Convention were designed to protect the child for the limited period before the foreign court took over and were not to be used to fetter or delay the enforcement of the decision to return the child. The Court of Appeal so held in a reserved judgment, dismissing the mother's appeals against (i) the order of Mr Justice Kirkwood, on April 15 that her two children be returned to Israel forthwith, pursuant to The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 as enacted by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and (ii) the decision by Mr Justice Johnson on June 20 to decline jurisdiction to hear the mother's application to set aside the order. Mr Augustus Ullstein, QC and Mr Timothy Scott for the mother; Mr James Munby, QC and Miss Indira Ramsahoye for the father. LORD JUSTICE BUTLER-SLOSS said that it had been argued for the mother that a Hague Convention order was analogous to custody and access and was to be treated as interlocutory. Accordingly, it was for a Family Division judges to vary or set aside the order and not for the Court of Appeal. The procedure in Hague Convention cases was summary and intended expeditiously to deal with the mischief of wrongfully removing children from the jurisdiction of their habitual residence. Under article 11 speed was of the essence. It was entirely different from internal proceedings, concerned with making orders based upon the principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child. Article 13, if invoked, dealt with specific instances where the welfare of the child might inhibit an order for return. Article 13 had to be raised as a defense to a Convention application and a court had to be satisfied that the matters raised were so important as to displace the prima facie requirement to return the child upon proof of wrongful removal or wrongful retention. The order to return or not to return was final in the Hague Convention proceedings brought by the central authority and disposed of those proceedings. Any proceedings dealing the custody, residence or other needs of the child were between different parties with considerations . wholly different from those relevant to a Convention application to return the child. Now that Her Ladyship had heard further argument on the issue she was not persuaded that her earlier view that a Hague Convention order was a final order was wrong (see In re M (a Minor): (Child abduction) [1994] 1 FLR 390, 397E)) and Mr Justice Johnson had clearly been right to refuse to entertain an application to set aside the order of Mr Justice Kirkwood which was a matter for the Court of Appeal. It was perhaps helpful to remind those involved in Hague Convention applications about position of undertakings or conditions attached to an Article 12 order to return. Such requirements were to make the return of the children easier and to provide for their necessities, such as a roof over their head, adequate maintenance, and so on, until, and only until, the court of habitual residence could become seised of the proceedings brought in that jurisdiction. The court had to be careful not in any way to usurp or to be thought to usurp the functions of the court of habitual residence. Understandably, the requirements made in this country must not be so elaborate that their implementation might become bogged down in protracted hearings and investigations. Undertakings had their place in the arrangements designed to smooth the return of and to protect the child for the limited period before the foreign court took over, but they must not be used by parties to try to clog or fetter or in particular c; delay the enforcement of the paramount decision to return the child. It would be helpful if realistic time limits for the compliance with the undertakings were included in the orders to return the child. In the absence of a specified time clearly the court would consider a reasonable time and not allow the case to drag on with repeated applications to the court. Lord Justice McCowan and Sir Tasker Watkins agreed. Solicitors: Reynolds, Porter, Chamberlain Margaret Bennett & Co, Bloomsbury.